Date of engagement: 19th August 2024 - 28th August 2024
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Timur GüvenkayaPrincipal advisor
Engagement Dashboard
Audit results
Guvenkaya conducted a security assessment of the Sweat Booster smart contract and the step jars feature inside the Sweat Jar smart contract. During this engagement, 7 findings were reported. 2 were Critical, 3 High, and 2 Medium severity. The Sweat Foundation team has fixed all issues.
Engagement record
- Client
- The Sweat Foundation Ltd
- System
- Sweat Booster and Sweat Jar contracts on NEAR
- Review period
- 19th August 2024 - 28th August 2024
- Paths in scope
- 29
- Principal advisor
- Timur Güvenkaya
Timeline
- Review start19th August 2024
- Draft report28th August 2024
- Final report19th December 2024
Findings by severity
Finding status at final report
Remediation complexity
Impact
Likelihood
Advisory and Client
The advisory
Guvenkaya specializes in security for digital assets and financial infrastructure, from smart contracts and protocols to applications, infrastructure, custody and cryptography.
Our team, including the sitting Heads of Security at Gauntlet and Agora, brings experience from Kraken, OpenZeppelin, Binance, ZKsync, Nillion, Invicti and EY. Across the team: 200+ security reviews, $30B+ in volume secured, 13 published cryptography research papers, and credentials including OSCP, OSWE and CISM.
- Every reviewer has a public bio and is named before you sign. We match expertise to your system, with a principal leading scoping and checking findings.
The client
The Sweat Foundation is an organization behind Sweat Economy, an innovative project at the intersection of fitness and crypto. It motivates users to stay active by converting their steps into SWEAT Token. This approach promotes health and fitness and works as an entry point to crypto for many users.
Scope and Review Boundaries
Review depths
- Deep
- Line-by-line review with explicit attack hypotheses, adversarial reasoning about state transitions, and reproduction attempts for each hypothesis that survived reading.
- Supporting
- The code was read for its effect on a reviewed flow. Behaviour outside that effect was not assessed.
- Targeted
- Entry points were exercised or triaged against the flow's security properties rather than read in full.
This is the code we read, and how closely. 29 paths are in scope. Each path links to the file at the reviewed commit.
Out of scope
The audit will include, but is not limited to, reviewing the code for security vulnerabilities, coding practices, and architecture. The audit does not include a review of the dependencies. Only the changes related to the step jars are in scope for the Sweat Jar contract.
Assessment Framework
Guvenkaya rates findings by likelihood and impact so remediation can be prioritized by technical risk, business context, and the decision the engagement is meant to support.
Rating chain applied to every finding
- 01 Likelihood Likely, possible or rare
- 02 Impact Severe, moderate or negligible
- 03 Severity Derived from the matrix below
- 04 Remediation complexity Simple, moderate or difficult
- 05 Status Not fixed, fixed, acknowledged or scheduled
Impact
| Impact | What it means here |
|---|---|
| Severe | Exploitation could result in critical loss or compromise, such as full system control, substantial financial loss, or severe reputational damage. |
| Moderate | Exploitation may lead to limited data loss, partial compromise, moderate financial impact, or noticeable degradation of services. |
| Negligible | Exploitation has minimal impact, such as minor data exposure without significant consequences or slight inconvenience without substantial disruption. |
Likelihood
| Likelihood | What it means here |
|---|---|
| Likely | The vulnerability is easily discoverable and not overly complex to exploit. |
| Possible | The vulnerability presents some challenges either in discovery or in the complexity of the attack. |
| Rare | The vulnerability is either very difficult to discover or complex to exploit, or both. |
This matrix provides a nuanced view, taking into account both the ease of discovering a vulnerability and the complexity involved in exploiting it.
| Attack Complexity \ Discovery Ease | Obvious | Concealed | Hidden |
|---|---|---|---|
| Complex | Possible | Rare | Rare |
| Moderate | Likely | Possible | Rare |
| Straightforward | Likely | Possible | Possible |
Severity
| Severity | What it means here |
|---|---|
| Critical | Assigned to vulnerabilities with severe impact and a likely likelihood of exploitation. |
| High | For vulnerabilities with either severe impact but only a possible likelihood, or moderate impact with a likely likelihood. |
| Medium | Used for vulnerabilities with severe impact but a rare likelihood, moderate impact with a possible likelihood, or negligible impact with a likely likelihood. |
| Low | For vulnerabilities with moderate impact and rare likelihood, or negligible impact with a possible likelihood. |
| Informational | The lowest severity rating, typically for vulnerabilities with negligible impact and a rare likelihood of exploitation. |
| Likelihood \ Impact | Severe | Moderate | Negligible |
|---|---|---|---|
| Likely | Critical | High | Medium |
| Possible | High | Medium | Low |
| Rare | Medium | Low | Informational |
Remediation complexity
This measures how difficult it is to remediate a finding once it has been identified.
| Remediation complexity | What it means here |
|---|---|
| Simple | Patches or fixes are readily available and easily implemented. |
| Moderate | Requires some time and resources to remediate, but well within the capabilities of most organizations. |
| Difficult | Remediation requires significant resources, specialized skills, or substantial changes to systems or architecture. |
Finding status
This tracks the client's response to each finding and whether remediation has been completed, accepted, or scheduled.
| Status | What it means here |
|---|---|
| Not Fixed | Indicates that the vulnerability has been identified but no remedial action has been taken yet. This status is crucial for newly discovered vulnerabilities or those awaiting prioritization. |
| Fixed | This status is applied when the vulnerability has been successfully remediated. It implies that appropriate measures, such as patching, configuration changes, or architectural modifications, have been implemented to resolve the issue. |
| Acknowledged | This status is used for vulnerabilities that have been recognized, but for various reasons (such as risk acceptance, cost, or other business decisions), have not been fixed. It indicates that the risk posed by the vulnerability is known and has been consciously accepted. |
| Scheduled | This status indicates that the vulnerability has been acknowledged and a plan is in place to fix it in the future. It signifies that while remediation hasn't yet occurred, the issue has been prioritized and is part of the planned development roadmap. |
Findings Summary
Findings register
| Finding | Impact | Likelihood | Severity | Remediation complexity | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GUV-1: Missing Access Control On NFT Transfer Resolver | Severe | Likely | Critical | Simple | Fixed |
| GUV-2: Missing Access Control On Account Score Recording | Severe | Likely | Critical | Simple | Fixed |
| GUV-3: Per User DoS Of The Claim & Withdraw Functionality | Severe | Possible | High | Complex | Fixed |
| GUV-4: DoS Of Record Score Functionality | Severe | Possible | High | Complex | Fixed |
| GUV-5: Inconsistent State After NFT Burn | Severe | Possible | High | Moderate | Fixed |
| GUV-6: Possible Scam Scenario Via Race Condition | Moderate | Possible | Medium | Simple | Fixed |
| GUV-7: Score Is Not Reverted After Failed Transfer | Moderate | Possible | Medium | Simple | Fixed |
Detailed Findings
GUV-1: Missing Access Control On NFT Transfer Resolver
Description
We observed that nft_resolve_transfer function lacks any access control. By using this function, a malicious actor can steal NFTs from any account.
#[near]impl NonFungibleTokenResolver for Contract { fn nft_resolve_transfer( &mut self, previous_owner_id: AccountId, receiver_id: AccountId, token_id: TokenId, approved_account_ids: Option<HashMap<AccountId, u64>>, ) -> bool { self.tokens .nft_resolve_transfer(previous_owner_id, receiver_id, token_id, approved_account_ids)}} Recommendation
Consider adding the #[private] macro on top of the function to make it only callable by the contract itself.
Remediation
The Sweat Foundation team has fixed the issue by adding the #[private] macro on top of the function in this commit: fe94acf23ec7af8bd5d0ae26ec7db75af36f47dc
GUV-2: Missing Access Control On Account Score Recording
Description
We observed that record_score function lacks any access control. By using this function, a malicious actor can put any score to its account and then claim the reward.
#[near_bindgen]impl ScoreApi for Contract { fn record_score(&mut self, batch: Vec<(AccountId, Vec<(Score, UTC)>)>) { let mut event = vec![]; let now = block_timestamp_ms(); for (account, new_score) in batch { self.migrate_account_jars_if_needed(&account); ... } } Recommendation
Consider asserting that only manager can call this function.
Remediation
The Sweat Foundation team has fixed the issue by asserting whether the caller is the manager in this commit: f09a5d482e02726ffaa38f4f5b1bbfaf8c3261ad
GUV-3: Per User DoS Of The Claim & Withdraw Functionality
Description
It was observed that it is possible for a malicious actor to trigger DoS of claim and withdraw functionality by locking jars of other users. During the withdrawal and claiming process, account jars are temporarily locked to prevent race condition issues. When callback is reached, the lock is released. However, if there was a panic in the callback function, the lock would not be released, causing jars to be locked forever. In return, it won't allow users to claim or withdraw from them. In the current implementation, it is possible to get the panic in the callback by reaching the log limit since at the end of the function the log is emitted containing all of the jars that were processed. In addition, it is possible to create a jar for someone else and there are no limit in the number of jars that can be created per account. These scenarios open up the possibility of this attack on each user:
- 1. 1. Pick a victim account. 2. 2. Create a ticket with the receiver and get the signature. 3. 3.Do ft_transfer_call with a staking message to create a jar for receiver. 4. 4. Repeat 2 and 3 until you create around 470 jars (enough to cause log limit) 5. 5. Wait until the user tries to claim or withdraw all 6. 6. Now all of the victim's jars are locked
PoC
#[tokio::test]async fn per_user_dos() -> anyhow::Result<()> { let mut context = prepare_contract( None, [ RegisterProductCommand::Locked12Months12Percents, RegisterProductCommand::Locked6Months6Percents, RegisterProductCommand::Locked6Months6PercentsWithWithdrawFee, RegisterProductCommand::Locked5Minutes60000Percents, ], ) .await?; let alice = context.alice().await?;let manager = context.manager().await?;let products = context.sweat_jar().get_products().await?;assert_eq!(4, products.len()); context .sweat_jar() .create_jar( &alice, RegisterProductCommand::Locked12Months12Percents.id(), 1_000_000, &context.ft_contract(), ) .await?;let alice_principal = context.sweat_jar().get_total_principal(alice.to_near()).await?;let alice_interest = context.sweat_jar().get_total_interest(alice.to_near()).await?;assert_eq!(1_000_000, alice_principal.total.0);assert_eq!(0, alice_interest.amount.total.0);context.fast_forward_hours(1).await?;context .sweat_jar() .bulk_create_jars( alice.to_near(), RegisterProductCommand::Locked5Minutes60000Percents.id(), 10000, 500, ) .with_user(&manager) .await?; context.fast_forward_minutes(5).await?; context .sweat_jar() .claim_total(true.into()) .with_user(&alice) .await .expect_err("The length of a log message 16440 exceeds the limit 16384"); // CLAIMING AGAIN BUT ALL JARS ARE LOCKED let claimed_details = context.sweat_jar().claim_total(Some(true)).with_user(&alice).await?; let ClaimedAmountView::Detailed(claimed_details) = claimed_details else { panic!() }; let claimed_amount = claimed_details.total.0; assert_eq!(claimed_amount, 0); // Cannot withdraw context .sweat_jar() .withdraw(U32(1), None) .with_user(&alice) .expect_error("Another operation on this Jar is in progress") .await?; Ok(()) } Recommendation
We propose switching to having a single jar per product to avoid any types of DoS attacks due to limitless jars.
Remediation
The Sweat Foundation refactored the jars codebase to have a single jar per product in this PR: https://github.com/sweatco/sweat-jar/pull/114
GUV-4: DoS Of Record Score Functionality
Description
We observed the record_score iterates over user jars to then perform interest calculation. However, since there is no limit on the number of jars per account, it is possible for an attacker to create a large number of jars for a single account and then when oracle calls the record_score function it will lead to a panic due to the gas limit. This will cause DoS of record_score every time there is a malicious account in a batch.
for jar in &mut account_jars.jars { let product = self .products .get(&jar.product_id) .unwrap_or_else(|| env::panic_str(&format!("Product '{}' doesn't exist", jar.product_id))); if !product.is_score_product() { continue; } let (interest, remainder) = jar.get_interest(&score, &product, now); ...} Recommendation
We propose switching to having a single jar per product to avoid any types of DoS attacks due to limitless jars.
Remediation
The Sweat Foundation refactored the jars codebase to have a single jar per product in this PR: https://github.com/sweatco/sweat-jar/pull/114
GUV-5: Inconsistent State After NFT Burn
Description
We observed that the booster smart contract will have an inconsistent state if a user minted more than 1 token and then redeemed/burned. That's because even if a user has more than one token, the whole entry of tokens_per_owner is removed. If minted again, the nested structure will show that it has a length of 1, for instance, even though when we manually call .contains() it will include 2 tokens.
fn burn(&mut self, token_id: TokenId) -> TokenMetadata { self.owner_by_id.remove(&token_id).expect("Owner not found"); if let Some(approvals_by_id) = &mut self.approvals_by_id { approvals_by_id.remove(&token_id); } self.token_metadata_by_id .as_mut() .and_then(|by_id| by_id.remove(&token_id)) .expect("Token metadata not found")} PoC
#[test]fn burn_token_inconsistent_state() { let oracle = oracle(); let mut context = Context::new(&oracle); let media = "bafkiufjkssmvjby7srbr44ivexsexqvdvjby7hhoobl3q3twim3bgxffrm".to_string(); let media_hash = Base64VecU8::from(b"w5SZrIcpoakfcRUl5EvCa4hy2ZzscFe4bnZDNhNcpYs=".to_vec()); let denomination = U128(2_000_000); context.switch_account(oracle); // MINTING 1st TOKEN context.with_deposit_yocto(DEPOSIT_FOR_MINTING, |context| { context .contract() .mint_balance_booster(alice(), denomination.clone(), media.clone(), media_hash.clone()); }); // MINTING 2nd TOKEN context.with_deposit_yocto(DEPOSIT_FOR_MINTING, |context| { context .contract() .mint_balance_booster(alice(), denomination.clone(), media.clone(), media_hash.clone()); }); let alice_tokens = context.contract().nft_tokens_for_owner(alice(), None, None); assert_eq!(2, alice_tokens.len()); let token_to_burn = alice_tokens.first().unwrap(); context.contract().burn(alice(), token_to_burn.token_id.clone()); let burnt_token = context.contract().nft_token(token_to_burn.token_id.clone()); assert!(burnt_token.is_none()); // NONE EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE 1 UNBURNED TOKEN LEFT assert!(context .contract() .tokens .tokens_per_owner .as_ref() .unwrap() .get(&alice()) .is_none()); // MINTING ANOTHER ONE context.with_deposit_yocto(DEPOSIT_FOR_MINTING, |context| { context .contract() .mint_balance_booster(alice(), denomination, media, media_hash); }); let alice_data = context .contract() .tokens .tokens_per_owner .as_ref() .unwrap() .get(&alice()) .unwrap(); // LEN IS 1 EVEN THOUGH WE HAVE 2 TOKENS assert_eq!(alice_data.len(), 1); // CONTAINS 1 AND 2 EVEN THOUGH THE LEN IS 1 assert!(alice_data.contains(&"1".to_string())); assert!(alice_data.contains(&"2".to_string()));} Recommendation
We propose removing the outer entry only if the nested entry is empty. Otherwise, the nested entry has to be updated and inserted back.
Remediation
The Sweat Foundation team has fixed the issue by removing the outer entry if the internal one is empty: ebe5d8012d56907b8db261c301d9699a7916aec2
GUV-6: Possible Scam Scenario Via Race Condition
Description
We observed that it is possible to perform NFT transfer operations while the redeem process is in progress. After redeem process is done, in the callback the NFT is burned. This situation opens an opportunity for a malicious actor to scam another user/system.
Example: Alice wants to redeem SWEAT voucher in the third party and receive any other token in return. That third party maybe reselling voucher or doing something else with that NFT (NFT is needed for them)
- 1. 1. Alice initiates a call to redeem the NFT voucher. 2. 2. At the same time, Alice calls
nft_transferto transfer NFT to the third party. 3. 3.Alice receives tokens or something else in return from the third party 4. 4. Callback is reached after 2 blocks and that NFT is burned from the third party.
Result: Alice received something from the third party but another side received nothing since their NFT got burned.
Recommendation
We propose checking whether the redeem is in progress inside of the nft_transfer and the nft_transfer_call.
Remediation
The Sweat Foundation team has fixed the issue by including a check which prevents calling nft transfer function during the redeem process: cc4da86d967771c776a70c223d9fd26495484245
GUV-7: Score Is Not Reverted After Failed Transfer
Description
We observed that in the claim_jars_internal, the score is set to zero after fetching the score to get the interest. After the transfer is done, if the transfer fails, the score is not reverted to the previous value inside of the after_claim_internal callback. If a user tries to repeat the same operation, the user score will remain zero, which leads to the incorrect interest calculation for that user.
fn claim_jars_internal( &mut self, account_id: AccountId, jar_ids: Vec<JarIdView>, detailed: Option<bool>,) -> PromiseOrValue<ClaimedAmountView> { let now = env::block_timestamp_ms(); let mut accumulator = ClaimedAmountView::new(detailed); let unlocked_jars: Vec<Jar> = self .account_jars(&account_id) .iter() .filter(|jar| !jar.is_pending_withdraw && jar_ids.contains(&U32(jar.id))) .cloned() .collect(); let mut event_data: Vec<ClaimEventItem> = vec![]; let account_score = self.account_score.get_mut(&account_id); let score = account_score.map(AccountScore::claim_score).unwrap_or_default(); for jar in &unlocked_jars { ... /// On claim we need to clear active scores so they aren't claimed twice or more.pub fn claim_score(&mut self) -> Vec<Score> { let today = self.timezone.today(); let result = if today == self.update_day() { let score = self.scores[1]; self.scores[1] = 0; vec![score] } else { let score = vec![self.scores[0], self.scores[1]]; self.scores[0] = 0; self.scores[1] = 0; score }; self.updated = block_timestamp_ms().into(); result} Recommendation
We propose reverting the state of the score to the previous value in the after_claim_internal.
Remediation
The Sweat Foundation team has fixed the issue by reverting the score in the callback: 6967bccb40eaa8f5b36494f99c2408ad359f0b49
The web version and the PDF (21 pages) are generated from the same source. The report as first delivered is kept in the public reports archive.